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I 
MOTION TO DISMISS WRIT OF ERROR 
Examination of the Record, pages 10 and 11, shows that 
the accused was indicted by the grand jury attending the 
April, 1926, term of the Circuit Court of Henrico County 
for violation of the prohibition law. He was tried at the 
July, 1926, term of the court (R., p. 12), the trial resulting 
in a verdict of guilty with his punishment fixed at six 
months' confinement in jail and a fine of one hundred 
( $100.00 )' dollars (R., p. 13) . 
Final judgment was entered in the case on July 16, 1926 
~--------~--------------~.--~----------~---------------------
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(R., pp. 12, 13). The bill of exceptions (R., pp. 14, 17) 
was not presented to the judge for signature until Sep-
tember 15, 1926 (R., p. 14), and was signed by the trial 
judge on that day (R., p. 17). Under the decisions of this 
court the bill of exceptions was presented after the time 
fixed by law had expired. 
Section 6252 of the Code of 1919 as amended provides 
in part: 
"Any bill of exception may be· tendered to the 
judge and signed by him, at any time before final 
judgment is entered, or within sixty days from the 
time at· which such judgment is entered. * * *'' 
In the recent case of Pembroke Lime Stone Works v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., 139 Va. 270, 272 (1924), 
this court said : 
"We have uniformly held that bills of exception 
not filed within the time prescribed by section 6252 
of the Code were no parts of the record, and could 
not be considered. Bragg v. Justis, 129 Va. 354, 106 
S. E·. 335; Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160, 112 S. E. 
757; Harley v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 664, 108 
S. E. 648; James v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 723, 112 
S. E. 761; Rea v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 714, 115 
S. E. 381." 
It will be seen from an examination of the record that 
counting the 16th day of July, 1926, the day on which the 
final judgment was entered (R., p. 12) as one of the sixty, 
we have sixteen days in July, thirty-one days in August 
and fifteen days in September, making sixty-two days. 
From this it will be seen that the sixty days had already 
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expired when the bill was tendered to the trial judge for 
his signature. 
This court had under consideration this identical question 
in Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160 (1922). In that case the 
final judgment was entered on March 29, 1920, and the bill 
of exceptions was tendered to the trial judge on May 28th, 
and signed by him on May 29th. 
This court in dismissing the writ said ( 133 Va. 171) : 
"Counting the day of the judgment as one of the 
sixty, we have three days in March, thirty days in 
April and twenty-eight in May, making sixty-one 
days, SQ that the sixty days had already expired 
when the bill was tendered to the judge for his signa-
ture." 
In Thrift v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 800 (1922), a similar 
question was also presented to the court. In that case final 
judgment was entered on October 31, 1921, and the bill of 
exceptions was not signed and made a part of the record 
until December 30th. Of this the court said (133 Va. 801'-
802): 
"This was not within sixty days of the final 
judgment, as prescribed by section 6252 of the 
Code. The date on which the final judgment was 
rendered is to be counted as one of the sixty days. 
Kelly v. Trehy, ante, p. 160, 112 S. E. 757, decided 
at this term, and cases cited. Thus counting, there 
was one day in October, thirty in November and 
twenty-nine in December. The sixty days expired 
on the last-mentioned date. December 30th, when 
the bill was signed, was the sixty-first day. The trial 
judge was without jurisdiction to sign the bill of 
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exception on December 30th. Bragg v. Justis, 129 
Va. 354, 106 S. E. 335; Exporters v. Butterworth, 
257 U. S ... , 42 Sup. Ct. 331, 66 L. Ed." 
It will, therefore, be seen that the trial judge was with-
out jurisdiction to receive and sign the bill of exceptions in 
this case and this court, under the authority of the decisions 
cited above, on its appearing to it that the bill of exceptions 
was not signed within sixty days from the day of final 
judgment, has no bill of exceptions properly before it, and, 
therefore, the writ of error should be dismissed as im-
providently awarded, the sole questions . before the court 
being presented by the so-called bill of exceptions. 
II 
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
The accused was indicted by the grand jury attending 
the April, 1926, term of the Circuit Court of Henrico 
County for violation of the prohibition law, the omnibus 
form of indictment being returned (R., pp. 10, 11). On 
the trial of his case at the July, 1926, term he was found 
guilty by the jury and his punishment fixed at six months' 
confinement in jail and a fine of one hundred ($100.00) 
dollars (R., pp. 12, 13). Final judgment was entered on 
this verdict July 16, 1926 (R., pp. 12, 13). From this 
judgment the case has been brought to this court on writ of 
error. 
THE FACTS IN THE CASE 
The indictment (R., p. 11) charges that the offense was 
committed in the County of Henrico "on the . . . . day of 
February in the year one thousand nine hundred -and 
twenty-six.'' 
Police Officer Hedgpeth testified (R., p. 14) that the of-
fense occurred on the night of February 26 on the Tappahan-
nock highway, Henrico county, Virginia. On that night he 
arrested three persons-George Timmons, one Ford and 
Mrs. Timmons-for the unlawful transportation in an auto-
mobile belonging to the accused of thirty gallons of ardent 
spirits. Hedgpeth testified that the accused, Frank B. Tim-
mons, was in the car, but succeeded in escaping; that the ar-
rest occurred at night between 10 :15 and 11 o'clock; that in 
making the arrest he used his flash light and in that way 
was able to "positively identify Frank D. Timmons as the 
one who was in the car and he knew him by sight" (R., 
pp. 14, 15). The accused was arrested on the following 
Sunday. It is certified by the court in the bill of exceptions 
"that Hedgpeth upon questions asked by the court and 
making the accused stand up testified that the accused was 
the man that ran away and he had no doubt of and gave his 
reasons therefor-and that there was a direct conflict of 
testimony in the case." 
The Policeman Dawson, who assisted Hedgpeth _in the 
capture of the car, it is certified, gave the same testimony 
as that given by Hedgpeth. The defense was an alibi. 
The accused's wife testified that she was in the automo-
bile which was transporting the whiskey at the time it was 
captured and that her husband was not in the car. George 
Timmons, who was also in the automobile, testified that the 
accused was not in the automobile. 
The accused testified (R., p. 16) "that he had been at 
horne from 8 o'clock on that night." In support of his alibi, 
Mrs. Annie Oliver testified that she was at Timmons' home 
in the city of Richmond from 8:00 until11 o'clock February 
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26th "and that Frank B. Timmons was there all that time" 
(R., p. 15). 
Frank Shepperson (R., p. 15) testified that he was at the 
home of the accused from 8 :00 until 10 :30 on the night 
of February 26th, "and that Frank Timmons was there all 
that time." On the other hand, the accused's witness, 
Stanley Haines, testified that he saw the accused come out 
of the confectionery of the 2200 block West Cary street be-
tween 10:15 and 11:00 o'clock and go to his home. 
Some indication of the standing of Mrs. Oliver may be 
inferred from the fact that she stayed, according to her 
testimony, with the accused at his home from 8:00 until 
11 :00 at night while his wife was out transporting a car-
load of whiskey. 
Manifestly, the testimony of Mrs. Oliver and the accused 
that he was in his house all of the time from 8 :00 until 
11:00 P. M. on the night of February 26th could not be true 
if his witness, Stanley Haines, of the Richmond Fire De-
partment, saw him coming out of a confectionery between 
10:15 and 11 :00 that night (R., p. 15). 
In addition to this, it is to be recalled that George Tim-
mons said that the man who ran was some stranger that 
had been picked up by him on the road who had asked him to 
give him a ride to Richmond. It is hard to believe that any 
person traveling along the road with thirty gallons of 
whiskey would thus accommodate a stranger overtaken on 
the road. 
THE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
There are two assignments of error: 
1. That there is no proof that the crime was committed 
within the period of limitation. 
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2. That the testimony of the officers with reference to the 
identification of the accused is too unreliable to be credited 
in the face of the testimony of the lady, who stayed with the 
accused while his wife transported the whiskey, and the 
other witnesses introduced by the accused. 
We shall discuss these assignments in their order. 
THE FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
Examination of the record shows that the indictment 
charged that the crime was committed "on the ---------------- day 
of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and 
twenty-six" (R., p. 11). The indictment was found on 
April 5, 1926 (R., p. 11). The case was continued on April 
14, 1926, until July 7, 1926, on motion of the accused (R., 
p. 12), and the trial occurred on July 16, 1926, at which 
time the jury found him guilty "as charged" (R., p. 13). 
The testimony of the Policeman Hedgepeth is that the 
crime occurred on the night of February 26th (R., p. 14). 
A number of the witnesses introduced by the accused speak 
of the night of February 26th with reference to the time 
when the offense occurred (R., p. 12). 
No plea of the statute of limitations was introduced by 
the accused, nor was this question raised in the trial court 
either by plea or by motion to set aside the verdict of the 
jury (R., p. 13). It is raised for the first time in this court. 
Under these circumstances the question has been conclu-
sively settled by the decision in Earhart v. Commonwealth, 
9 Leigh ( 36 Va.) 671, 677 ( 1839), where it is said: 
"It was said in argument, that a new trial should 
be granted because it does not appear that the of-
fense was committed within twelve months before 
the indictment was found. Apparently, this objec-
tion is made for the first time here. It does not ap-
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pear to have been made below, either before the jury 
or the (!ourt. The time laid in the indictment is 
within the period limited for the prosecution; there 
is a verdict of. guilty; and it does not appear from 
the evidence that the time of the act was without the 
period of limitation. We cannot say, therefore, that 
there was error. We cannot say that the indictment 
was not within twelve months from the time of the 
offense. Doubtless it was shewn to be within the 
twelve months, and the blank in the bill of exceptions 
was merely accidental. In a case like the present, we 
think the pa'rty should in some .manner have relied 
on the statute, or claimed the benefit of it. (Italics 
supplied.) 
The law has long been settled in this State in civil cases 
that upon the trial of an issue joined on the plea of the 
statute of limitations, t,he burden of proof is on the defend-
ant to show that the cause of action did not accrue within 
the statutory period. Goodell v. Gibbons, 91 Va. 608 
(1895), Lewis v. Ma.~on's Admr., et al., 84 Va. 731 (1885), 
Elam v. Bass, 4 Munf. 18 Va. 301 (1814). Where the time 
is properly laid in the indictment so as to conform to the 
rules applicable to criminal pleading, there is no reason why 
the same rule should not be applied to the proof in criminal 
trials. The burden of proof is, of course, on the Common-
wealth to establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The plea of the statute of limitations is properly a 
matter which should be raised and proved by the accused, 
just as it would be by the defendant in a civil case. There 
is no more reason why the Commonwealth should be re-
quired to prove that the offense was committed within the 
period of limitations than there is for the plaintiff to prove 
in a civil case that the cause of action occurred within the 
period of limitations. However, as had been pointed out 
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above~ the decision in Earhart v. Commonwealth, supra, has 
settled the specific question raised by this assignment of 
error against the contention made by the accused. 
THE SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
Under the second assignment of error it is strenuously 
insisted that the evidence is· not sufficient to support the 
verdict of the jury; the argument of counsel being that the 
testimony of the officers as to the identification of the ac-
cused by means of a flash light during the night time is of 
too uncertain and insignificant nature to be allowed to con-
trol the testimony of the witnesses offered by the accused. 
The testimony of Hedgepeth (R., p. 14) is direct and 
positive that the accused was in the car and succeeded in 
making his escape. He testified that he used his flash light 
and in that way "was able to positively identify Frank B. 
Timmons as the one who was in the car, and he knew him 
by sight" (R., pp. 14-15). The ·accused was asked to stand 
up in court, and upon questions asked by the trial judge, 
Hedgepeth testified "that the accused was the man that 
ran away and he had no doubt of and gave his reasons there-
for." 
It is certified (R., p. 15) that the testimony of the police-
man, Dawson, was the san1e as that given by Hedgepeth. 
The law is well settled that any witness may give his 
opinion as to the identity of a person whom he has. seen, 
provided he has some knowledge of or acquftintance with 
the person with whom he identifies the person seen by him. 
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6 Ency. of Evidence, 912; 
Hopper v. Commonwealth, 6 Gratt. (47 Va.) 684, 686-
687 (1849); 
Gentry v. McMinnis, 3 Dana (Ky.) 382-382 (1835); 
State v. Harr, 38 W. Va. 58, 62-63 (1893) ; 
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 104 Mass. 545 (1870) ; 
Commonwealth v. Kenrtedy, 170 Mass. 18, 23-24 (1897). 
It appears from the record that Hedgpeth testified that he 
knew the accused by sight at the time of the capture of the 
car (R., p. 15). 
The same point made under this assignment of error as 
to the sufficiency of the identification of the accused was 
made in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 104 Mass. 545, 547 
(1870). In that case, which was an indictment for larceny 
of a horse and wagon, the only question was one of identity, 
whether the prisoner was the person who stole the horse and 
wagon. The wi.tnesses for the Commonwealth testified that 
they saw a man driving off the stolen wagon on the day the 
theft took place; that they did not notice that the man had 
an imperial; and that a few days afterwards they separately 
and without any suggestion picked out the prisoner from 
among others in the station house as the man they thought 
was on the wagon; but that they were not positive, as the 
prisoner had then an imperial and different clothes; and 
that they would not swear that the prisoner was the man 
they saw on the wagon; but that he resembled him. At 
the close of the case the defense requested the court to direct 
an acquittal, which the court declined to do. The defense 
then asked the judge to instruct the jury "that as no wit-
ness sworn in the case had given evidence that the defendant 
was the man who committed the crime set' forth in the in-
dictment, or the man who was seen in the possession of the 




The judge refused this instruction, but instructed the 
jury that they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
of the identity of the defendant with the person seen to 
drive off the wagon; that there was no rule of law defining 
the manner in which this identity was to be proved, or de-
scribing the terms in which witnesses must testify to it to 
produce conviction in the minds of the jury; that the whole 
question was one of fact for them to pass upon; that if, 
from the testimony of the witnesses, taken in connection 
with their means of knowledge, their acts at the station 
house, and their present appearance and manner upon the 
stand, together with any other evidence in the case, the 
jury were satisfied of the fact of identity beyond a reason-
able doubt, then they might convict; that there were cases 
where the concurrence of separate and independent impres-
sions as to identity might be as convincing as the positive 
opinion of a single witness; but that on the other hand, if 
the evidence fell short of producing a belief in their minds 
beyond a reasonable doubt, no mere probability would jus-
tify a verdict of guilty. Exception was taken and error 
assigned. 
In passing on this question the court said, speaking 
through Ames, J., p. 547: 
"The. only question that appears to have been in 
controversy was whether the defendant was suffi-
ciently identified as the person who committed the 
crime charged in the indictment. The general cir-
cumstances of the transaction were not in dispute. 
Upon this question of identity, the evidence offered 
was all of it competent and proper for the considera-
tion of the jury. It is impossible to say that it had 
no tendency to convict the defendant. Its sufficiency· 
was to be estimated and weighed exclusively by them. 
It is not necessary that any one witness should dis-
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tinctly swear that the defendant was the man, if the 
result of all the testimony, on comparison of all its 
details and particulars, should identify him as the 
offender. The principle which allows evidence to 
go to the jury necessarily involves a right, on their 
part, to believe it, and if its effect upon their mjnds 
should be to prove the defendant's guilt beyond rea-
sonable doubt, their verdict will be rendered accord-
ingly." 
It will be seen that the evidence of the identification in 
the case at bar is much stronger than was the evidence of 
the identification in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, supra. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted, first, that the mo-
tion to dismiss the writ of error as improvidently awarded 
should be sustained, and, second, that if this motion should 
be overruled that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Hen-
rico is correct and should be affirmed. 
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